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EVEN NON-EXTREMISTS
GET THE BLUES:
THE RHETORIC OF COPYRIGHT
by Wendy J. Gordon and Lois F. Wasoff***
Introduction
The participants in this dialogue are Wendy Gordon and Lois Wasoff.
Each is an intellectual property expert who has immersed herself in
copyright law and policy for over twenty years. Neither sits at an extreme
end of the policy spectrum, yet the two disagree over a wide range of
issues. The editors of this volume thought their discussions could prove
useful to others struggling with copyright dilemmas. Accordingly, Gordon
and Wasoff sat down with a tape recorder for us. In edited form, their
dialogue follows here.
Dialogue
Wendy Gordon (WG):
We are addressing the great divide in today’s copyright debate. One
side identifies itself more with the public domain and a greater freedom
to use copyrighted materials. The other has been accused of identifying
itself more with media industries and emphasizes greater incentives to
disseminate copyrighted materials. Both sides contend they are on the side
* Copyright © 2005 by Wendy J. Gordon and Lois F. Wasoff.
** Wendy J. Gordon is Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law at Boston University
School o f Law, and Visiting Scholar, Department o f Comparative Media Studies, MIT. Lois F.
Wasoff is the former Vice President and Corporate Counsel of Houghton Mifflin Company and
now has a private legal practice specializing in copyright policy issues, particularly as they relate
to publishing. Her clients include commercial and nonprofit publishers and publishing trade
associations as well as authors. The authors thank Brandon Ress, BU Law ‘05, and Jessica Tripp,
Suffolk Law ‘05 for their excellent research and editorial assistance, and Benjamin Kaplan. Henry
Horbaczewski and Iris Geik for their inspiration. Wendy Gordon wishes to wishes to thank Richard
Stallman, Rebecca Tushnet, and David McGowan for helpful comments. She emphasizes that none
of them are responsible for her errors or her views. Lois F. Wasoff thanks James Catterton for
his patience and support. The authors also note that their shared intention in this dialogue was
to talk about how people talk about copyright. They did. of course, stray into substance, but neither
of them intends this dialogue to be the definitive statement of their views on any of the many
topics mentioned.
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of bettering American lives. What ideas and interests truly underlie this
debate?
Lois Wasoff (LW):
The question we want to explore is whether we are so caught up in
rhetoric and disagreement that we can’t see our common interests. If we
speak more plainly about what really worries us, might we find at least
some convergence?
WG: Rhetoric sometimes gets in our way. For example, proponents of
giving greater power to copyright owners sometimes trumpet ‘natural
rights’ as if John Locke led directly to the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. But audiences have natural rights, too. As Professor Benjamin Kaplan
wrote, “[I]f man has any ‘natural’ rights, not the least must be a right to
imitate his fellows . . . Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of
mimicry, and ‘progress’, if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on
generous indulgence of copying.” 1
So how did ‘natural rights’ become the clarion call of the propertarians?
You and I come from different ends of the copyright policy spectrum. I
tend to favor more limits on copyright than you do. Yet, our underlying
interests converge in the idea that copyright is about creativity. We both
are interested in the question of whether, in the big picture, copyright law
is becoming more of a threat rather an incentive to creativity.
LW: We would imagine that this kind of inquiry would be a common
ground for those involved in copyright policy debates. But many people
do not believe that good policy and historical developments fundamentally
link copyright to creativity. They believe that copyright is an institution
designed to serve only the publishing and entertainment industries. I think
this helps to explain the heat and the anger in some of the rhetoric: the
belief that copyright has come to stand for corporate ownership rather than
creativity.2
1 B enjamin Kaplan , A n Unhurried V iew of Copyright at 2 (1967), reprinted above at page
2. That Locke would not have supported unlimited private rights is shown by his famous “proviso”
(John Locke, Locke’s Second treatise of civil government at Ch. V §§ 26-32), and by the document
in Lord King, The Life and Letters o f John Locke (London 1884) 202-09 (memorandum from 1693
in which Locke expresses inter alia the view that rights over copying should be limited in time.)
For explication of the proviso’s implications for copyright, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right
in Self Expression, 102 Yale L.J.1533 (1993) (arguing that the Lockean proviso entitles the public
to significant liberties to use others’ creative labor).
2 For a discussion about copyright and authors, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in
Copyright, 45 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1 (Fall 1997).
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WG: Yes. Many who favor fewer copyright restrictions believe, as a
descriptive matter, that copyright only serves the interests of the publishing
and entertainment industries, and that makes them angry. On the other
side, many who are angered by unauthorized copying believe, as a
prescriptive matter, that it’s dissemination and marketing that most needs
copyright’s support. Our hope is to help defang some of the surrounding
rhetoric so the two sides can begin to talk to each other a little more
productively.
LW: We should also mention something that you put on the agenda when
we were planning this project: namely, that the debate tends to be
conducted on the fringes, in terms of nightmare scenarios. So that those
who are on the lower protectionist side will talk about all the information
being locked up with contractual restraints preventing the reuse of even
public domain material — that’s their nightmare. And those who are on
the side of stronger protection will talk about a wholesale invasion of the
rights of authors under which nothing will be able to be created and
distributed publicly.
WG: So in one nightmare, a combination of law and technology prevents
tomorrow’s Tom Stoppard from writing disrespectful versions of Hamlet.3
In the flipside nightmare, copying makes publishing so unprofitable that
tomorrow’s Hemingway has to spend his days flipping burgers at
McDonald’s.
LW: Exactly. And it will be interesting in our conversation to see how
much of the polarity in the debate comes from these fears, and from
underlying definitional issues.
WG: Some of the debate’s polarization happens because people want bad
guys to pursue. Whether they know it or not, they create straw men to
meet this need. As a result, sometimes one side ends up doing the other
side’s dirty work — creating nightmare scenarios that drive the debate
further to extremes.
For example, the movie industry has been criticized for trying to make
people think that downloading a movie is as bad as stealing physical
property. The law doesn’t take that view, and it would be a tragedy if
people started to believe that all copying was stealing. Yet Jed Rubenfeld,
3 See Tom Stoppard , R osencrantz and Guildenstern are D ead 11967). For discussion
of whether copyright and technology could ever lead constrain the public's use o f public domain
materials such as Shakespeare’s plays, see infra at 23-24 (discussion of West Side Story's adaptation
of Romeo and Juliet).
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a proponent of very limited copyright, reinforces a related error when he
writes:
In some parts of the world, you can go to jail for reciting a poem
in public without permission from state-licensed authorities. Where
is this true? One place is the United States of America.4
As a metaphor, that’s interesting. But as a statement of law, it reinforces
an erroneous and pernicious myth about how restrictive copyright is.
The first problem with the claim is the reference to getting permission
from “state licensed authorities.” That implies that a government agent
decides who can or cannot recite a particular text. Copyright does not work
this way. Permission need be sought only from the private person who
owns the copyright, and anyone can be a copyright owner — you don’t
need to pass some kind of governmental review approving your content.
Second, as a matter of ordinary copyright law, no one violates copyright
simply by “reciting a poem in public” without permission. For nondramatic
literary and musical works, copyright law requires a live performer to
obtain permission from the copyright owner only in a narrow range of
circumstances — circumstances quite different from the poetry reading
in Professor Rubenfeld’s’s example. The interrelation of Sections 106 and
110(4) of the Copyright Act make the freedom for noncommercial inperson performance very clear.5 I find other problems with Professor
Rubenfeld’s statement. It suggests that criminal infringement will become
an issue when you recite a copyrighted poem in public. That ignores the
statutory requirements for criminal infringement6 and the strong scienter
requirement.7 If believed, this kind of rhetoric can distort cultural activity
as much as overbroad copyright law can — for instance, making someone
who loves Eliot or Larkin, instead recite Marvell or Donne, out of fear
4 Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale LJ. 1,
3 (2002).
5 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 110(4). Section 106(4) gives the copyright holder the exclusive right
to perform the copyrighted work publicly. Yet the right is subject to the provisions o f Sections
107-122. Section 110(4) sets forth circumstances under which a public performance will be free
of any control by the copyright owner. Most relevant to Professor Rubenfeld’s example, Section
110(4) provides there can be no copyright infringement for live public performances of a
nondramatic literary work so long as there is no admission charge, no payment to the performer
or others, and no other direct or indirect commercial advantage. Sec. 110(4). There are even
exemptions sheltering some public performances where admission is charged. Id.
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1997).
7 See § 506(a); United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1048 (D. Neb. 1991) (defendant
acquitted on the ground that he acted out of an honest belief that his acts constituted “fair use”.)
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that reciting a recent poet will bring a jail term. So Professor Rubenfeld
is using a straw man to make copyright seem much worse than it really
is. The belief that copyright is this restrictive may constrain people’s use
just as real copyright does. It scares people into a mistaken belief about
what they must do to remain law-abiding citizens.
LW: I’m glad we’ve begun by finding something we basically agree on.
I also think setting up straw men is unproductive, although I do take issue
with your characterization of the positions taken by the film industry. All
copying is not theft, but in my view most film downloading is either theft
or civil infringement, as is most music downloading. Recent court deci
sions support this. Direct infringement was not an issue in the 9th Circuit’s
Grokster opinion,8 which was about whether P2P services were liable for
vicarious or contributory infringement, but the District Court decision it
upheld acknowledged that the downloading itself was often infringing.9
On the question of straw men, I can give you another example. I have
been told as though it is gospel fact that the DMCA10 simply ended fair
use. Now you can argue, and we may in the course of this discussion,
about whether or not the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA have
had or will have a negative impact on the exercise of the fair use privilege
in certain circumstances, but it didn’t end fair use. And the statute says
quite clearly that 107 (the fair use provision)11 survives. But that is the
myth. Now, even in circumstances in which uses were obviously fair in
the past, people are concerned because they think there has been a
wholesale change in the fair use doctrine that affects traditional uses.
WG: I am not sure that the DMCA causes no wholesale change. Even
if a consumer would only make a fair use of copyrighted material, he’s
not allowed to decrypt an encrypted copyrighted work. The DMCA puts
us all under a duty not to circumvent technological barriers to see or hear
what’s behind them. So a technological barrier can defeat both access and
fair use.
8 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 280 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004)
9 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F.Supp.2d. 1029 (CD Cal. 2003)
10 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C §§ 1201-1205 (1999). Several courts have con
sidered the effect of the DMCA on fair use. These courts have agreed that a fair use reason for
circumventing access controls is not a defense to a DMCA cause of action. See e.g.. Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.
Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D.Cal. 2002).
II See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
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Admittedly, as a doctrinal matter, fair use remains a defense to tradi
tional copyright infringement. If you somehow get access without violating
the DMCA, any copies or derivative works you then make are eligible
for fair use treatment.
But how much is that worth?
To put this into an example, say a film critic on a local access cable
channel wants to make a digital copy of a short scene from an encrypted
DVD — say he needs to manipulate the lighting to explain what he doesn’t
like about the movie’s cinematography. If the encryption allows the DVD
to be played but not copied, the critic will need to bypass the encryption
to prepare the demonstration for his audience. In the process he violates
the DMCA, and he can’t cite fair use as a defense to the bypass. Sure,
as to the copy he made and the manipulation he did after violating the
DMCA, the fair use doctrine is applicable. But I’m not sure the doctrine
is very effective at that point. The critic is already in legal trouble.
If he didn’t want to worry about the DMCA, he could play the movie
on his television screen, get out his video camera, and simply film what
appears on the TV screen. In this instance, there would no need to mess
with the encryption.
LW: That is the example that the court gave in the Reimerdes12 case, when
it upheld the DMCA.
WG: Yes, that case is the source of my example. But it’s going to be
very hard for the critic to make the point that he wants to make, with only
a blurry analogue video to use.
So yes, traditional fair use remains — even things behind these
electronically locked doors can be used in some way — but only so long
as the critic does not break through the door, and only so long as he hasn’t
had to waive the fair use doctrine as part of the price of entry. If these
conditions are met, the doctrine is still available when he makes a copy.
The people who make the claim you are concerned with — that the
DMCA ended fair use — are probably thinking of an additional scenario.
They fear that a time will come when virtually everything is online. Paper
storage will be expensive and become incredibly infrequent. Maybe
Shakespeare’s plays and other public domain works will cease to exist
12 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In Reimerdes,
defendants posted on their website (and linked to other websites with) the source code to DeCSS,
a program used to circumvent copy protection on DVDs. Universal and other motion picture studios
filed suit under the DMCA’s trafficking provisions to enjoin the defendants’ activity.
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in paper copies, except the rare ones that the public can’t touch, and one
or two regular copies in a basement archive somewhere. People would
have access to Shakespeare — the folios and various other versions of
his works — only online.
I’m among the people who worry about the abuse of the DMCA should
that day ever come, since virtually all online works can be encrypted.
LW: I think its worth noting that, in the real world, publishers and other
copyright proprietors have permissions departments that exist to consider
and often grant requests for uses that go beyond fair use.
WG: To secure our rights, we shouldn’t have to depend on the kindness
of strangers. Even strangers who really are kind.
LW: I don’t think “kindness,” for good or ill, is particularly relevant here.
Permissions decisions are made on the basis of a number of factors,
including the need to accommodate customer concerns and evaluations
of the financial impact of the proposed use on the proprietor. But, to return
to your hypothetical, it implies that manipulating the digital version is the
only effective way to demonstrate the concept. It may be the most
convenient for the critic, but I don’t think that should be the controlling
factor.
WG: It should indeed make a difference, whether the copying is essential
or a mere convenience. But I’m not sure that’s the sort of question that
interests most permissions departments; I expect that typically they are
making a business decision. By contrast, that’s what the fair use doctrine
is for: to examine how compelling a need the defendant has, and to
examine whether fulfilling his need will on balance help society or hurt
it.
LW : Actually, I don’t think that is what “fair use” does. Societal
considerations are obviously built into the structure of fair use, but what
fair use does is evaluate a particular use in a specific context. You are
defining “good use” not “fair use” and not all “good” uses are fair under
the copyright law.
WG: To the extent the courts apply the fair use doctrine as you describe
it, that’s one of the reasons a First Amendment defense to copyright
infringement needs to be explicitly recognized. But I’d like you to respond
to my concern that all information will eventually be delivered digitally,
encrypted, and accessible only to people who click ‘yes’ to a contract.
LW: First, I view that as a “nightmare scenario.” That day is not in our
lifetimes. Legislation can barely keep up with what is happening now, let
GORWAS-7
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alone attempt to contemplate a parade of horribles that may or may not
occur twenty or thirty years from now. This idea that all information is
going to be online and locked up behind encryption is one of the most
popular but also, in my view, one of the least convincing nightmare
scenarios.
Secondly, I think it ignores the policy behind the DMCA, which was
to increase the availability of information in digital form, not limit it.
Congress decided that to induce copyright proprietors to make their works
available in new technological forms, it had to give them a way to protect
their rights to those works against wholesale authorized copying and
distribution.13 And in my view, the policy is working. It is not a
coincidence that movies started being distributed in large numbers on
DVDs only after the DMCA was passed. Of course, it didn’t take long
for a Norwegian teenager to break through the CSS encryption and make
DeCSS available on the Internet. But the law gave the copyright proprietors
the legal recourse they needed to try to keep the inevitable leakage down
to a tolerable level, instead of the hemorrhage they would have encountered
otherwise.14 On top of that, even if present trends continue and more and
more information becomes available digitally, why should we assume that
analogue and paper copies will completely disappear? Finally the present
trend toward digitization is not exactly continuing as anticipated. Just talk
to anybody in the publishing industry about the “promise” of the e-book
market and how that promise has not been kept.
WG: As we’re having this conversation. Professor Kaplan’s UNHUR
RIED VIEW is still out of print, so you are holding a copy purchased
from the Internet. You’re essentially using an e-book version.
LW: [Holding up 135 pages of print.] No, we’re using a print-on-demand
version of the book. Why are you and I holding this printed copy? Not
just because we are of an age where we prefer to read things in print rather
than on the screen, at least those things that we want to spend some time
thinking about. The copy of Jed Rubenfeld’s article you referred to was
delivered to you in digital format and printed by you, because the physical,
paper printout was the more convenient form.
13 See, e.g. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (“Due to the ease with which digital works can
be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to
make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be
protected against massive piracy.”)
14 Universal City Studios, Inc., 111 F. Supp.2d 294.
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WG: I think you are proving my point. There is a push toward the use
of digital formats and away from delivery through traditional tangible
copies.
LW: That is certainly true, although I think I should note that even though
the book and the article came to us through the use of digital technology,
we are able to make fair use of their content. But I am making a different
point, which is that whatever the mechanism by which the content is finally
delivered to the end user, whether it remains in a digital format and is
used and manipulated that way or whether it is translated to a print format
and is used and manipulated that way by the end user, the object is to
make it available.
WG: You mean to do precisely that, to make it available?
LW: Yes. Publishers are called publishers because they are in the business
of publishing, meaning they are in the business of actually giving people
access to materials. They are not in the business of locking things away,
of denying access. That’s one of the reasons why I don’t find the nightmare
scenario of all content being digitally locked up to be convincing.
WG: I’m glad to concede that if unencrypted books remain, then fair use
of those books would also remain. At least that would be the case under
the current version of the DMCA. But I’m not as sanguine as you are
about the playing field that old-fashioned books and prints will face in
the future. Let’s imagine a young cartoonist or painter who goes online
looking for interesting images to experiment with. Or the young writer
who’s given an assignment to burlesque an existing story. The works that
are easy to copy are the ones that are likely to influence the artistic
development of these young people. Online access is convenient, and often
convenience rules.
On your more fundamental point, regarding publishers wanting to make
books available, I don’t see why you assume a convergence of interest
between publishers and the public. Of course publishers want to give
people access. But on what terms? We have antitrust law not because price
fixers want to make widgets unavailable — they get no pleasure or profit
from hoarding widgets — but because the companies want to sell the
widgets at high prices. Making something available doesn’t mean making
it available at the lowest price consistent with incentives, or making it
available in an unrestrictive manner.
LW : W e’re talking about copyright, not illegal restraints of trade or
antitrust conspiracies. Making things freely available doesn’t carry with
GORWAS-9
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it an obligation to make them available free. Nor should it — copyright
is based on an economic incentive system.
WG: And the way the incentive system works is to give copyright owners
the potential to attain a kind of market power. So it’s extremely relevant
to look at competition policy. We can’t talk about copyright without talking
about other relevant laws. Contract law is another example.
Sellers of online works can place contractual restrictions on what users
do with what they download. Consider a case like ProCD,15 where a
contract prohibiting commercial use of a database was enforced, even
though the database was in the public domain. If ProCD is followed, and
licenses of the shrink-wrap and click-through form survive — along with
their restrictions — we may as a society be in big trouble. Five years from
now, you may not be able to access an electronic copy of An Unhurried
View without clicking a box that says that you agree to give up your fair
use rights.
LW: ProCD is being followed now, and the world has yet to come to
an end. As you said, ProCD did not involve a copyrighted work, but the
distribution of copyrighted works has always been managed through
contracts, and the protections of state contract law have been adequate
to prevent serious abuses.
WG: I*m not sure of that. Look at the restrictive legend that Westlaw
makes appear on printouts.16 There can be overreaching contracts.
15 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). In ProCD , the court held that plain
tiff’s shrink-wrap license was enforceable. The holding has been questioned both on grounds
internal to contract law, and on the ground o f pre-emption: the mass-market contract, whose force
arises out of state law, essentially changed the public domain status that the database possessed
under federal law. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implications for Contract, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1367 (1998). ProCD nevertheless remains a leading
case.
16 On October 26, 2004, Professor Gordon downloaded one of her own articles from Westlaw.
Although she owns the copyright to it, she found each page of the printout bore a West copyright
notice, and the following restrictive legend was attached:
“(C) 2004. Copyright is not claimed as to any part o f the original work prepared by a U.S.
government officer or employee as part of that person’s official duties. All rights reserved. No
part of a Westlaw transmission may be copied, downloaded, stored in a retrieval system, further
transmitted or otherwise reproduced, stored, disseminated, transferred or used, in any form or
by any means, except as permitted in the Westlaw Subscriber Agreement, the Additional Terms
Governing Internet Access to Westlaw or by West’s prior written agreement. Each reproduction
of any part of a Westlaw transmission must contain notice of West’s copyright as follows: “Copr.
(C) 2004 West, a Thomson business. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works.”
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LW: The contracts can also be permissive and fair, and often are. One
of the many things that is consistently ignored in the rhetoric about license
agreements is the fact that most license agreements for content give
licensees more rights than they would have if they simply acquired a copy
of a work covered by copyright — rights, among others, to share access,
to make additional copies in different formats. The licenses that are
overreaching, and I concede that those kinds of licenses do exist, are
changing, as they have to, in response to the needs of the customers.
WG: I continue to see contracts with overreaching terms. However, since
I don’t have data at hand and this is an empirical question, let me simply
refine the logical structure of my position here: First, there is a reasonable
fear that the DMCA gives extra leverage to disseminators who may find
it in their interest to impose contractual restrictions that abrogate existing
rights and liberties. These rights could come from fair use, the public
domain status of the materials (such as legal opinions and classic litera
ture), or general rights under the First Amendment. The concern is that
these liberties might be contracted away. Second, there is a fear that even
if the public retains its ordinary fair use rights and its ordinary right to
copy judicial opinions and other public domain materials, the public will
only be able to make those uses in a second-class manner. Remember the
film critic; how is he going to show the great difference that subtle lighting
effects can make, if he can’t manipulate a clear digital image?
People who pay for licenses can use these wonderful new technologies
to create new forms of art or take notes by cutting and pasting. All of
the great stuff — the use of the Internet to access materials, the use of
new media in music or text or other areas, the ability to email digital copies
to each other — can be restricted to those who agree to licenses and pay
the price.
LW : In the debate about shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses, I think that
many participants remain willfully ignorant about market place forces and
the need to be flexible and to respond to customer demands. To use a
publishing example, when articles from scholarly journals began to be
distributed in digital form licenses were much more restrictive. Journal
publishers were concerned that they were going to gut the market for the
paper versions and destroy their ability to sell things like printed reprints
of their works and so they were protective. Journal articles are now
primarily distributed in digital form. The business need to protect the print
version has for the most part disappeared. Journals still exist in print,
though many of them have their primary existence, in terms of the number
GORWAS-l 1
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of users that get access to them and in terms of the amount of money that
is generated, through their use in digital form. And licenses have not
become more restrictive — they have become less restrictive. What is
common now in the area of journal publishing are “repertory licenses,”
which are a single license agreement that gives access to every journal
published by a particular publisher for a single fee for a broad range of
uses. Journals are also being distributed under site licenses that let
everybody at a university or institution or everybody coming from a
particular set of IP addresses use the materials in a very broad and
straightforward way. So the market in that instance opened up the licensing
practices, because the market forces are critically important. But I think
they are underestimated in the debate. The horror stories about the
contractual barriers that are going to be created are way too common and
not supported by reality.
The issue of licenses is an important one, and it will continue to be
debated. But I think it is worth noting here that these licenses have been
and are being upheld. For example, in a recent case involving Miramax,
the court rejected a claim that a contract was pre-empted by the Copyright
Law, on the basis that “the bargain is not for the idea itself but for the
services of conveying the idea,” the point being that the publishers’
providing access to works in a digital form is an extra service that justifies
permitting additional contractual restrictions.17
WG: Private contracts can upset the balance that makes copyright work.
What serves a private person has impact for the rest of us. For example,
Galileo got a benefit by recanting his theory about the solar system —
namely, the Inquisition lifted its threat of imprisonment — but his
recantation could have retarded the science of astronomy for many years.
We all could have lost out.
LW: That’s a nice rhetorical argument, but I’m not convinced. Contracts
are agreements between individual parties; they generally manage relation
ships only between private entities, and should be evaluated in terms of
the relationship between those parties. But I accept your point that there
are some provisions in agreements that can and do implicate public policy
concerns.
I’d like to follow up on something else you said. “Fair use rights?”
WG: Absolutely. Or more precisely, fair use liberties are a subset of rights,
just as all entitlements are a subset of that grand category.
17 Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004)
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LW: That seems like an overstatement to me, and a distortion of the
history. Fair use began as a judicially created doctrine and wasn't even
part of the Copyright statute until the 1976 Act. Fair use is a defense to
infringement claim, or perhaps could be characterized as a “privilege,"
not a “right.”
WG: To the contrary, what we call “fair use” is actually what's left of
an immense statutory liberty, namely, the liberty resulting from the
narrowness of the copyright owner’s rights in the early days of copyright.18
The issue decided in Folsom v. Marsh, usually cited as the first fair use
case, was in reality the question of whether or not the defendant had
produced ‘a fair and bona fide abridgement’19 — for producing such
abridgements was something the public under then-current law had a right
to do without the permission of the copyright proprietor.20 When the early
copyright statutes declined to give copyright owners a broad derivative
work right, they provided to the public the same kind of “federal right
to “copy and to use’ ” that Justice O’Connor spoke of in Bonito Boats.21
As a technical matter, I don’t see any problem with calling any defense,
including fair use, a ‘privilege’. However, the word ‘privilege' has the
unfortunate connotation of something ‘undeserved’. The word has also
been a battleground historically, with many commentators claiming that
copyright itself is a ‘privilege’.
This may be an example of how the rhetoric creates misunderstandings.
The word ‘right’ is a capacious term. It’s used to embrace any legal
entitlement, or even moral claims. The person who did the most to clarify
the many ways in which we lawyers use the term ‘right’ was Wesley
18 The first American copyright statute, in 1790. gave a copyright proprietor rights over printing,
reprinting, publishing, vending, and importation: no right over derivative works was mentioned.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
19 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (1841). See, e g.. L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use.
55 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249 (1992) (arguing that Folsom contracted rather than expanded the
then-existing ‘abridgement’ defense). Whether the courts were correct to read the early statutes
as creating a ‘fair abridgement’ defense has been questioned. See Eaton S. Drone. A Tki amse
O n The Law O f P rop erty I n I n t e lle c t u a l P roductions In G rea t Bretajn And Thi Unhi d
S ta te s. 433-45 (Rothman Reprints 1972) (1879).
20 Under the copyright law then in force, the copyright proprietor's rights in books were still
limited to “printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending”, sec. 1. as well as importing and
“exposing] to sale”, sec 6. By contrast, for some visual and musical works (including prints, maps,
and musical compositions), the 1831 law made unlawful “varying, adding to, or diminishing the
main design with intent to evade the law.” (Sec. 7). 4 Stat 436, 21st Cong, 2d Sess.. c 16 (Act
o f February 3, 1831).
21 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U S. 141, 165 (1989).
GORWAS-13

AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT/REPUBLISHED WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS

Hohfeld.22 He came up with a typology that gave separate names to each
of the various rights we have. So in the terminology that’s developed after
him, the ‘right’ to contract has come to be called a ‘power’ to contract.
The ‘right’ to obtain redress through the courts is called a ‘claim right’
to sue.23 The ‘right’ to fight back against an attacker is called a ‘liberty’
or ‘privilege,’ as in the privilege of self-defense.
Hohfeld is probably most famous for distinguishing between ‘claim
rights’ on the one hand, and ‘privileges’ or liberties on the other. I do
not think anyone believes fair use is a claim right. Having a claim right
means you can get the government to act on your behalf. But at most,
a defendant employs fair use to keep the government from impounding
the derivative works he’s made or demanding damages or a fine from him.
Nobody imagines that fair use can be used to have the government force
someone to give you access. Fair use can only be used to stop people from
suing you.
LW: You see that distinction, but I think there are some people from the
“low protectionist” side who feel differently, and who are making the
argument that fair use “rights” carry with them an implication of a right
of access.
WG: Are you thinking of the DMCA context, where the statute prohibits
users from bypassing encryption to get access? If ‘fair use’ were applicable
under the DMCA, it wouldn’t give consumers a claim right — they
couldn’t go to a judge and demand she order a copyright owner to publicly
post decryption keys. Fair use would simply protect people from jail or
lawsuits when they figured out a decryption key on their own, or obtained
a decryption key from some other willing provider.
But that doesn’t mean it’s wrong to talk about “rights of access.”
Liberties are rights. People who argue that the DMCA improperly restrains
fair use are really arguing that the government should restrain itself from
making the exercise of this liberty — the right of fair use — less frequent.
Regardless of categories, I think that is a coherent policy argument. We
value fair use not only as a legal doctrine, but also because it allows
creative and wonderful things to happen. Therefore the government should
not do anything that will make it more difficult to do the kinds of things
22 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in W esley N ewcomb Hohfeld , F undamental
Legal C onceptions as A pplied in Judicial Reasoning 23 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).

23 Hohfeld used the term ‘right’ to identify the power to call upon government for affirmative
assistance. Later writers have used the term ‘claim right’.
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with text, images and sound that were allowed under fair use prior to the
DMCA. The DMCA does make copying we’d consider “lair” more
difficult.
LW: In the pre-DMCA days, “fair use” didn't give you the right to take
a book from a bookstore without paying for it, just so you could make
“fair use” of its contents.
WG: When you lock the door to your house or your store, you're locking
up things you own. When you lock up knowledge that's partly in the public
domain, or that is common property when used fairly, you're locking up
more than you own.
LW : You can lock your door to protect the Rembrandt on your wall, and
you don’t have to permit the public into your house to view it just because
it is a public domain work. I think there is an assumption underlying your
argument, which is that the public is entitled to the most convenient or
most financially advantageous means of accessing and using copyrighted
expression. There is a recognized Constitutional right to interstate travel,
but that doesn’t mean you have a right to demand to fly first class, or
even to get a seat on a bus. The only mode of interstate travel guaranteed
to all citizens for free is walking. I don’t see why the fair use of copyrighted
material should be treated differently.
W G: Laws serve human purposes. Physical property has greater exclusion
rights than copyright does because people need predictability, security, and
privacy in their physical surrounds. Those needs are immensely reduced
— they’re not even of the same kind — when the threat isn’t strangers
invading your vehicle or your home, but rather the possibility that strangers
will use your work of authorship without permission.
So the question is not whether homeowners should lose the ability to
call the cops when someone breaks in to look at their Rembrandt. The
question is whether a copyright owner should have the ability to call the
cops when someone breaks an encryption key to look at the portion of
a website that’s public domain or otherwise fairly used.
LW : So far the courts looking at the question you’re raised have determined that the DMCA does not unreasonably interfere with fair use.24*
And of course the DMCA has a sort of safety valve built in, in the form
of the Copyright Office’s triennial review, to see if certain categories of
works should be exempted from the prohibitions on circumventing access
24
See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D.Cal. 2002 1: ^ee also Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
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controls.25 There have been two rule-making procedures so far, and the
Copyright Office has defined some coneededly narrow categories of
exempt works.26
WG: An approach to fair use that abandons context, and looks only at
types of works, misses the point. Works can be rightfully subjected to a
copyright owner's control in some contexts, hut in other contexts such
control may be wrongful.
LW: The Copyright Office has a very clear mandate in this area, and it
isn’t to do a “fair use” analysis.27 Every 3 years, the U.S. Copyright Office,
in consultation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, is required to
review the effect of the prohibition on circumventing access controls, and
determine whether there should be new' exceptions created for users of
a particular class of works if non-infringing uses (such as fair use) are
being or are likely to be adversely affected by the prohibition. I don’t see
how you can say that “context” has been “abandoned."
WG: That’s a good point; I exaggerated. But context only matters as to
classes of works; the Copyright Office procedure certainly isn't individual
ized as to users.
LW: I think the triennial review does address some of the concerns you’ve
been raising; apparently, you don’t. We should just agree to disagree and
move on. Instead, I’d like to talk about another thing you said earlier, when
you were talking about technical tools creating two classes of users: those
who can get access to the digital form of the materials and those who can
only get access thorough an analogue form.
WG: We are talking about people who are prohibited from breaking
encryption, so that even if they are doing something 'fair' they can only
film the image as it flashes across the screen rather than copy the digital
zeros and ones that generate the image. They may be able to access the
digital material through licenses, but fair users should not have to buy
licenses, except for some small set of fair uses that are based on high
transaction costs.28 I do not think we should require payment and a license
just because it is possible to charge for a license.
26 17 U.S.C. § I 201 (a)(l)(C )( 1999).
26 See 37 C.F.R. 201.40 (2000).
27 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)( 1)(B)-(E) (1999).
28 See W'endy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Lair Use: Transaction Costs
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. C opyright S o e 'y U S A. 140 (2003).
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LW: W e’re not talking about charging someone a license fee to make
fair use. We’re talking about license fees associated with giving access
to materials in certain forms. Now I agree with you that there could be
a conceptual problem down the road if and when material is only available
in a form that is encrypted. But I do not see that as a likely, immediate
event. And I don’t think it is appropriate to be legislating about it right
now. What I find troubling is the argument that is made about technological
tools and how because certain technological tools exist changes have to
be made in the copyright law to permit their use. I find that reasoning
circular and unsupportable. Just because a technology exists does not mean
that there is a requirement that everyone be able to use it or that there
is a requirement that the user have access to whatever content she wants
in whatever format is convenient for her. Just because there are technologi
cal tools that permit copying and distribution, I don’t think that necessarily
means that the copyright law needs to change to facilitate their use for
purposes that would otherwise be prohibited or would require permission
or payment. So I am really not persuaded by the “haves” and “have-nots”
argument.
WG: What is the “haves” and “have-nots” argument?
LW : The idea that the analogue user is somehow at a disadvantage.
WG: Wait a minute. I don’t understand. As a factual matter, it is true.
What is it that you don’t buy about it?
LW: I don’t buy that therefore the law has to be changed so that everyone
can become a digital user. We’ve talked about this before. You invited
me to observe one of your classes at Boston University, when David
Lange29 was speaking. It made a real impression on me when he said that
the downloading of entire songs is transformative use. It struck me as a
way of using fair use to justify, in effect, changing the law to accommodate
the technology — that the same behaviors that were infringing in the
analogue world are supposedly non-infringing in the digital world, so that
users can use all their new toys.
WG: I read Professor Lange differently. I think he fears that a commercial
ly-oriented statute has the danger of dampening the spirit. But even if his
view is as you depict, it hardly amounts to an argument that everything
must be sacrificed in order to give the girls and boys their toys. So that
returns us to the issue of seeing things in extreme terms.
29
David Lange is Professor of Law at Duke University. For a discussion of some of his views
on fair use and other issues, see Reimagining The Public Domain, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs.
463-483 (Winter/Spring 2003).
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I want to make a psychological claim about what we are all going
through. We are not just playing with nightmare scenarios. We are driven
by things that truly scare us. An image that feels very real and very
dangerous to me may feel unrealistic to you.
I am trying to convey that nightmare scenarios may sometimes be
rhetorically deployed, but they are based in emotional truths. The fears
are not faked. Also, we have spoken about one side setting up straw men.
But we should also give examples of the straw men on the other side.
There are people who say, “All you copyright academics want to destroy
copyright altogether.'’ In fact, the goal of almost everyone I know is to
make copyright better; to help rather than hurt it.
LW: I think some of that comes from sloppy rhetoric. As an example,
some of the same academics that you say want to help not hurt copyright
will talk about copyright being used to lock up “information” and “ideas.”
But facts and concepts are not protected by copyright, and I believe that
copyright law, even in the present form that you regard as too broad,
doesn’t impede their dissemination. But the rhetoric obscures the distinc
tion between ideas and expression that is at the core of copyright.
Copyright survives constitutional scrutiny not just because of the fair
use doctrine but also because of the idea/expression dichotomy. The idea/
expression dichotomy is a fundamental element of copyright law, as are
other doctrines like the merger doctrine30 and the scenes-a-faire/stock
character rules31 , all of which are examples of how copyright law contains
built in protections against the preclusion of future expression. I haven’t
taught copyright nearly as much as you have, but when I have I’ve tried
to explain the differences between copyright and patent by describing
copyright as being broad but thin and patent as being sort of narrow but
deep, because it covers the underlying concepts, not just their particular
expression in a specific work. I think that is an important distinction, but
it is something that conveniently gets ignored.
WG: It’s important to point out that the courts often fail to guard the
public's rights in facts, ideas and concepts as zealously as they should.
Nevertheless, downplaying that the courts often do indeed safeguard these
rights could create another straw man. By telling people “don’t copy
anything” and downplaying idea/expression, you converge on a picture
30 Pa h . Goldstein. Copyright. Patent. Trademark
596 (4th cd. 1997).
31 4 M elville B. N immer
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of copyright that has everyone cowering. This is only useful if you believe
that the law needs a wholesale revision and Congress passionately responds
to change the law. If this straw man does not lead to any changes, it makes
things worse for everyone, with people imagining that they lack the
liberties we have been discussing.
LW: There are things about copyright that could be changed. But this overdramatic, “Big Brother” view of all of copyright is counterproductive. It
has the impact, as you’ve said, of making copyright more intrusive than
it actually is, because it has an effect on behavior. And I think it limits
our ability to address, in a more surgical and appropriate way, things that
really could be fixed. For example, there is a lot you could do to ameliorate
the impact of the longer duration of copyright. There was some flexibility
built into the statute, to help libraries and archives.32 There could be other
changes made too, to make it easier and less risky to use so-called “orphan
works” — mostly older works for which it is difficult or impossible to
locate an owner. Canada has a licensing system in effect for those
situations;33 the Copyright Office here in the U.S. is beginning to look
at the issue too. But you are not going to be successful trying to throw
a bomb into the middle of the whole system, by introducing legislation
like the Public Domain Enhancement Act34 that would reinstate limited
copyright terms and formalities that are in clear violation of the U.S.’s
obligations under the Beme Convention.35
One thing that some advocates of very low level of protection are now
saying is that they want to go back to the act that Professor Kaplan was
operating under when he was first practicing law, to something like the
1909 law.
W G: As long as we’re talking about old copyright law, let’s look back
to the one the Founders adopted. Under the 1790 Act, if you made a
creative use of somebody else’s creative work and directed your work to
a different market, you were not subject to liability.
LW : That’s an interesting concept. I think it is impractical and actually,
ultimately, unfair.
W G: I think for some uses it would be unfair. For example, if someone
copies your book to make it into a movie, I think you should get money
32 See 17 U.S.C § 108(h) (1998).
33 See R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 77 (1985) (Can.)
34H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).
35 See Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
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from it. But I think there are many contexts where unauthorized derivative
works should receive more latitude than they currently do. Among other
things, I would like to go back to the technique used in some earlier stages
of the copyright law, of specifying particular derivative works that are
covered.
LW: Derivative works are a complex topic, but there were good policy
reasons behind the changes that have been made in how derivative works
are treated; among other reasons, they were made with the intention of
benefiting creators, to prevent “free-riding” on their works. I’d be cautious
about using the 1790 law as a model for derivative work protection, if
for no other reason than the fact that the types of derivative works that
could be created then is so different from those that could be created even
by 1909 and certainly by 1976 or today. I know you feel that the derivative
works should be handled differently.
1 think the purported appeal of the 1909 Act to others now, in 2004
remarkably enough, has more to do with the registration system and notice
requirement than derivative works issues. The appeal, at least on the
surface, of registration and notice is somewhat understandable, because
it can get unwieldy when you have copyright automatically arising . . .
WG: . . . in the grocery list.
LW: Exactly. Therefore you have this issue of works all over the place
that are putatively protected by copyright, the reuse of which might require
permission or payment. But, still. I’m intrigued by and bemused by this
desire to go back to that time.
WG: I do not think it is a movement back to an earlier time as much
as it is a way to clarify that we are not asking for something unworkable.
After all, we existed pretty well under that regime for a while.
LW: Yes, but in isolation in the world. The other thing that troubles me
about the argument is that it ignores the fact that the system that the U.S.
operated under was an aberration in the rest of the world and created
aberrational effects. The “back door to Berne” process, for example, where
works were simultaneously published in a Berne country to get Berne
Convention protection. I think this is an example of an intriguing academic
argument that can create problems when attempts are made to implement
the argument through legislation, because it ends up by discouraging the
investigation of more practical and ultimately workable solutions. I think
we've all been missing the opportunity to make changes that could actually
make life better for all concerned because we’re arguing the extremes and
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we’re trying to legislate there as well. I’m not denying that the fears are
real and I ’m not denying that some of the nightmares might have a grain
of truth in them. But, I don’t think they’re the right way to approach
making the system work for all of the participants in it, including the
individual creators, the users, and the publishers — all of whom, by the
way, can be each other at various points in the process.
The real underlying question, as we’ve discussed before, is whether
copyright is an incentive to creativity or an impediment to creativity. The
premise that a lot of the discussion starts from now is that copyright is
an impediment to creativity. I don’t like starting the discussion that way.
I don’t want to be put in a position where I have to accept that premise
in order to have the conversation. I’d like to go back and deny that 1 beat
my husband, before I’m asked how many times I did it. 1 believe that
copyright law is about authors and creativity.36
I think that there are some recent examples of places where incremental
changes, responding to particular needs, have been made and are helpful.
The addition of language to Section 107 regarding the use of unpublished
works is one example — it’s the only statutory addition to fair use since
1976, and was made at the suggestion of the publishing community.37 The
TEACH A ct,38 which was enacted in 2002, is another example. It
addressed the legitimate needs of the academic community for an expan
sion of the copyright exemptions in Section 110(2) for certain uses of
digital material in distance education and similar circumstances. The
TEACH Act was the result of a cooperative effort by the academic
community, the copyright proprietors and the Copyright Office, and grew
out of the Copyright Office report on digital distance education prepared
by the Copyright Office pursuant to the DMCA.39 The statute as ultimately
enacted balances the interests of both parties by providing teachers with
36 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright. 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. I (Fall
1997).
37 The following sentence was added to the end o f Section 107 of the Copyright Act in 1992:
“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding if fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration o f all the above factors.” This change was made in part in response to
the holding in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 818 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1987).
38 Technology, Education and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002, enacted November 2, 2002
(amending portions o f 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(2) and 112). At the time that the language of the TEACH
Act was being negotiated, Ms. Wasoff was the Chair o f the Association of American Publishers
Copyright Committee, and participated in that capacity in the development o f the statute.
39 Copyright and Digital Distance Education, http.7/ww w.copyright.gov7disted/(Last visited Dec.
28, 2004).
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access to copyrighted materials for use in their teaching activities, in digital
form, under a copyright exemption rather than as fair use. To protect the
interests of the copyright owners, there are specified limitations and
requirements. The TEACH Act is an example of how problems can be
addressed, and improvements made, if we talk to each other.
WG: Your example of the change to 107 has some merit, but I think the
TEACH Act is as much an example of the problem as it is of a possible
solution. In order to address a simple need — which was to enable
educators to make non-commercial use of materials in digital form as part
of teaching — the TEACH Act created a set of prerequisites, requirements
and limitations that would be more appropriate for inclusion in the Internal
Revenue Code than in the copyright law. If the current structure of our
copyright law weren’t problematic, one wouldn’t need to go to such great
lengths to provide an answer to such a straightforward and compelling
need.
But I want to return to the creativity issue. First, my fear isn’t that all
copyright hurts creativity, but that expansionist developments do — and
these developments aren’t even aimed at inducing authorial effort but at
assisting dissemination. Consider all the arguments that were being trotted
out in defense of the copyright term extension that spoke in terms of
encouraging digitization or film restoration, not authorship.
Second, about the role of nostalgia for the old law; I think it is an
interesting movement that is occurring. I do not believe it is a bad thing
to be different from other countries. One of the reasons we have succeeded
as a nation is because we had a better policy of sharing information —
freedom of speech — than other countries. I think the oddity of free speech
has directly helped us, and indirectly helped everyone who has learned
from the information we send out.
But in any event, let’s talk about notice. I always felt that the copyright
notice requirement served some useful purposes. It made it easier to find
out what was copyrighted and who owned it. When people did not care
about the copyright, and omitted notice when they published, the require
ment automatically put a great amount of material in the public domain.
I did, however, believe that the cure and forgiveness rules should be much
more generous than they were. But I do not think that anyone actually
wants to go back to 1909 or even 1978. I think people want a practical
rule that says: “Are you in some way affected by lack of notice? If you
are affected, you should get off the hook, at least for an injunction.” So
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it seems to me that instead of abolishing the notice requirement, we should
have drastically expanded the liberties that attach to using an unnoticed
work.
LW: I think that’s a suggestion that makes the point I’m raising, which
is if you think in terms of the structure that exists and of ways to make
improvements within that structure, you can have a constructive dialogue.
It doesn’t polarize the debate and make compromises less likely, the way
much of the current commentary does. I’ll give you example of something
I think is an impractical notion that tries to make law at the margins, instead
of working to improve the system we have. That is the suggestion of an
alternative compensation scheme for copyright owners, funded by impos
ing a tax on everyone who downloads, or who buys downloading media
or machines. Copyright owners would have to register their works with
the government, and the government would then tithe back a portion of
the taxes collected to the copyright owners.
Not only would it be a nightmare to figure out what the appropriate
amount of the “tax” should be, there’d be the nightmare of identifying
what the relevant “work” is. Because works migrate and change, what’s
the relationship of the original work to the derivative work? How do you
track what uses engender what payments?
WG: I think that tracking use and collecting tithes creates more than just
administrative and privacy problems. It also poses the danger that everyone
will start to think they must pay for everything they use. The whole point
of a society is interdependence. A major symbol and instantiation of that
interdependence is the existence of public goods. We all use them and
feel grateful for them. It helps us recognize that we all benefit from things
we do not ourselves create. We could end up in a system of total paralysis
if all of the reciprocal (or sometimes not reciprocal), generous (or not so
generous) acts of nonmarket interconnection vanish. It is not good to
commodify everything — or to commodify so much that people start to
feel that everything is cash and carry.
LW : I agree completely. I have some real problems with the taxing
schemes, but I ’ll limit myself to only one more example. It’s functionally
a compulsory licensing scheme. You and I have talked about the idea that
copyright is about money. But I think you and I both feel that copyright
is, more importantly, about the creative process. The creator’s ability to
make decisions about how and where works are going to be presented
or otherwise used, and in what context, should also be part of copyright.
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Under a compulsory license scheme, there’s no input from the creator into
the subsequent uses made of his or her work.
WG: On this last issue I am really much split.
LW: Is that because you would like to see a broader privilege for the use
of existing works to create derivative works?
WG: Yes; for example I’d like to see fewer injunctions against creative
adaptations. Yet there are problems if monetary remedies are all that’s
available. I think it is very important that creators do not come to view
their work in purely monetary terms. All sorts of problems appear when
an artist comes to think of her work solely in terms of the cash it generates.
When money comes into the picture too explicitly, people can begin to
focus so much on the money that they rely less on their intrinsic motiva
tions. I think a law that gave authors no control at all — where all they’d
have is the right to get paid — could erode the personal connection an
artist feels with her work and perhaps decrease its quality. I’m not
minimizing the importance of money — no one wants artists to starve
in garrets — but an injunctive right secures money in a way that’s less
potentially denigrating to the artist than restricting her recovery only to
money damages. On the other hand, restricting injunctions but preserving
money damages has the promise of compromise — of allowing defendants
more freedom of speech without badly eroding plaintiffs’ monetary
incentives.
I am a strong proponent of what Steven Shiffrin calls the “romance of
the First Amendment”40 — the idea that the First Amendment should
protect the rebel, the iconoclast, because that’s where the most vital,
leading edge of debate and perception will arise. Look at the word
“iconoclast”; it is about breaking an icon, shattering the particular notions
other people hold about an image. In other words, at the core of the First
Amendment is the freedom to take an image that someone else has created
and turn it to your own expressive devices.
LW: Or just smash it. But there is a balance to be struck here. The Court
in Eldred discussed this when it said that the First Amendment protects
your right to make your own speech, but it “bears less heavily when
speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”41 If you do
40 Steven H. Shiffrin, T he First A mendment, D emocracy
versity Press 1993).
41 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003).
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need to use someone else’s copyright-protected “icon” to make your point,
you can, so long as you are doing that within the bounds of fair use.
W G: The First Amendment goes beyond what the courts now recognize
as fair use — and as the quotation you gave indicates, the First Amendment
does give you rights even when you quote from another person’s creation.
The Eldred Court said the amendment “bears less heavily”, not “has no
bearing”.
LW : Isn’t the iconoclast protected by existing law?
W G: No, because he must get a license. The copyright holder will likely
not grant a license if he is doing something “nasty” to the work.
LW : But if it’s parody or criticism, he gets to do his smashing without
needing a license. Fair use says he can. It’s not always a completely clear
issue, I concede. Sometimes the line between an infringing derivative work
and a transformative fair use can be hard to define; in essence, that’s what
the “Wind Done Gone” case42 was about. But that case and others, like
Acuff-Rose,43 make it pretty clear that “icons” can be appropriate and
permissible targets.
WG: If only fair use were that clear! The Air Pirates took on the classic
‘icon’ of pop culture, namely Mickey Mouse and family, and were
enjoined.44
But let me go back for a minute. When we began this discussion about
the right of control, we were not talking about what copyright does or
does not do; we were talking about policies. I am trying to suggest that
there are two strong and important policies, honoring the artist who is the
icon creator, and honoring the iconoclast, who by altering the first icon
may make a more valuable one, or at least teach us something valuable
about the prior icon — perhaps demonstrating that an idol has feet of clay.
Our law makes a pretty good rough and ready division between these
policies. We give special protection to the artist under the Visual Artists
Rights Act when only a few copies exist.45 When many copies exist, fair
42 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (overturning
an injunction against the publication of a literary parody of “Gone With The Wind,” on the basis
that the use of characters, plot, major scenes and other copyrightable elements of the original work
by the author of the parody was protected as fair use). At the time that the case was being litigated,
Ms. Wasoff was Vice President and Corporate Counsel of Houghton Mifflin, and was responsible
for managing Houghton Mifflin’s defense o f the action.
43 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
44 Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (Cal. 1978).
45 The visual artist has a ‘right of integrity’, but note that under the Visual Artists Rights Act,
the original work is still subject to fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § § 106A and 107.
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use gives a lot of liberty to the iconoclast. I feel we should protect the
iconoclast even more and in other situations. Nevertheless, I am suggesting
that there are ways to walk the line between honoring the icon maker and
the icon smasher, and that if you put the duration issue aside, our law
has good tools to work with.
LW: I don’t disagree. The iconoclast, to use your terminology, is protected
by fair use and can make those kinds of decisions and can make those
kinds of changes. If the changes are critical or transformative, or don’t
replace or injure the market for the original work — all those factors are
going to weigh very heavily in favor of the iconoclast. But I think the
statute and the case law place appropriate limits, limits that are based at
least in part on the level of transformation involved. The Visual Artists
Rights Act addressed issues of integrity and attribution, but I don’t think
the application of fair use is affected in any meaningful way, particularly
given the ease with which individual works of art can be duplicated. If
your iconoclast wants to photograph and reproduce a painting, then draw
moustaches on it as part of a political or other commentary, let him go
ahead. His use of the whole work may work against him, but if the other
factors weigh in his favor, his action will be within the parameters of fair
use. Section 106A will keep him from drawing the moustaches on the
original work itself.
WG: Ok, so we’re in rough agreement. Let’s go back to a couple of other
things, including licenses and new technologies. About twenty years ago,
Stanley Liebowitz wrote an article46 that suggested that free library
photocopying would not necessarily hurt publishers. His investigation
suggested that the system would adapt by shifting the pattern of subscrip
tion pricing so that libraries had to pay much higher subscription prices
than individuals would — sort of a sub silentio site licensing. I think this
has come true. Sharing can increase value, both increasing the utility the
public can enjoy, and increasing the price sellers can charge to capitalize
on the public’s enjoyment. A library that can supply photocopies will value
its first physical copy of a magazine more highly than a library that can’t,
and will pay more to obtain that first physical magazine. The more
photocopying is done by library patrons, the higher will be the amount
that the library will pay for the things photocopied. And in many contexts
the appropriate people end up paying the price.
46 See S. J. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals, 93
J. Pol. Econ. 945 (1985).
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Take the example of a community setting like a university, where
everyone is economically interconnected. If the university library pays for
a site license, or pays a high subscription fee accompanied by a statutory
liberty to engage in fairly extensive copying,47 the copyright owner is paid,
and the people who do the paying are ultimately the people who do the
copying: As the library budget increases to pay higher subscription costs,
professors may receive a little less in their paychecks, and students may
have to pay a little more tuition, and that’s appropriate — these are the
people who benefit by using the library materials. But we should also
remember that sometimes it does not work out that way — sometimes
‘indirect appropriability’ isn’t possible because those connections do not
exist between the entity buying the license or the subscription, and all the
other folks who share the benefit. In those cases, the theory does not work
out as well.
LW : To your point about sharing, I think those circumstances are common
in many situations other than on university campuses, more than people
realize. I know it’s been common for a while now to talk about publishers
and libraries as antagonists, but I think that is shortsighted for many
reasons. In the digital world, libraries are particularly critical in bridging
the so-called “haves” and “have-nots” gap, and in fact, libraries are the
major purchasers of the kind of repertory and other licenses we discussed
earlier. The user may pay a little more in taxes to support the public library,
and the library may have to allocate its acquisition budget differently, but
I don’t think the point you are making, of sharing increasing value, is any
less valid in the non-academic world.
We can talk more about sharing if you want to, but I’d like to address
the other point you made about the Liebowitz article. It is true that
subscription pricing and site licensing have become important, but photo
copying is still a problem for publishers. And, as more information is being
distributed digitally, more copyrights are infringed digitally. I’m not just
talking about music downloads here, although that’s the particular use that
gets all the attention from the press. Document delivery services and interlibrary “loan” are all major issues for publishers, as they create an
alternative means for users to get access to content without having to
compensate the original publisher by purchasing a copy or a license.
47
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107 and 108; Williams & Wilkins Company v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).
Libraries situated within for-profit firms are differently situated. See, e.g.; American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994).
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There are ways to create individual transactions that meet the needs of
both users and content providers. The music industry was very slow to
respond to the market demand when technological developments like MP3
and the growth of available bandwidth made the exchange of music in
digital form so easy. In fact, the industry was slow enough so that other
mechanisms, Napster and other peer-to-peer alternatives, arose to meet
the market place demand. So the RIAA was put in the position of taking
aggressive steps to try to hold back the tide. Publishers, in particular journal
and other scholarly publishers, figured out a way to respond by changing
their business models through more liberal licensing policies. The music
industry has more recently begun to address copyright issues with new
business models, but they had to come from behind. If you and I want
to listen to some music now we can sit down at my computer and 1 can
download, for ninety-nine cents a song, an incredible range of things right
onto my desktop computer, and then copy them onto my iPod or my laptop.
It happened late, but it is a response — a successful, business response.
And it’s happening within the context of the current copyright law and
the emerging technology. So what we, the publishing community, as the
financial representative for good or ill, of the creative community, need
to do is to spend some time developing solid real new business models.
But the market place is going to provide the incentive, and a combination
of copyright protection and technology is going to provide the means.
WG: We should talk about the notion of “marketplace response” and the
laissez faire implications of the “market talk” that forms part of our
rhetoric. Let’s not forget that law shapes the market. Laws decide what
to favor and the market evolves in response. A good thing for the law
to do is shape ownership to help markets exist where they should, and
to keep markets out where they shouldn’t.48
Let me return to a concern you expressed earlier. I agree the public is
not morally entitled to the cheapest and easiest possible copies of works.
I do not think there is such an untrammeled entitlement, and indeed have
argued that there is a core of right that should be honored in terms of what
artists and authors deserve. But don’t mistake me: I believe that the core
of authorial moral entitlement is quite narrow. Further, the public also has
a core of rights to which it is entitled.49 In my view, current law gives
48 See generally, T he Commodification of Information (edited by Niva Eikin-Koren and
Neil Netanel) (Kluwer Information Law Series, 2002).
49 See Gordon, supra note 1.
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authors much more than they are entitled to, and it does not give the public
its full entitlement. For example, one of the topics appearing in copyright
debates now is that merit goods, like education, information, and access
to the classics, are things whose wide availability the government should
foster, but which are being restricted either by copyright or by encryption.
With a copyrightable introduction attached, a classic like Shakespeare can
be locked behind a DMCA prohibition.
LW : First, I disagree with your premise. I think availability is being
fostered by the current law, both because the creation and dissemination
of educational and scholarly works is being encouraged through the use
of copyright incentives, and because more materials are being made
available digitally because they can be protected. Second, you’re not
locking up “Shakespeare” if you are applying encryption to a single version
when others are available.
WG: I disagree. Convenience matters. We all get hurt if the future Leonard
Bernstein is discouraged from writing a future WEST SIDE STORY
because the DMCA requires him to negotiate a license to adapt ROMEO
AND JULIET. This gets us back to where we were before, about how
easy it should be to use Shakespeare and the rest of our heritage.
LW : We’re not talking about licenses to adapt — we’re talking about
access. Unless the DMCA kept Bernstein from getting to the only copy
of the play, you haven’t refuted my point.
W G: My concern was with the added burden — and with the possibility
of a license requirement that restrained Bernstein’s freedom to adapt. I
think your response to the latter concern is that the digitizer would have
no reason to limit Bernstein’s playing with Shakespeare. But that’s a matter
of factual prediction. Why take a chance that could result in restraining
the public’s use of the public domain?
LW : I don’t believe we are taking that chance, but I do believe that a
failure to protect creative works will lead to less creativity and less
availability, and I don’t want to take that chance. Bernstein’s use of
ROMEO AND JULIET is a classic example of truly creative, transforma
tive use.
I want to return to my point about increased availability. It costs money
to create that digital version of Shakespeare, and to write that foreword,
and to distribute it. Somebody is also paying to maintain the website that’s
delivering it. So the fact that there’s a license associated with it that offsets
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the cost of delivering it even though it's in part comprised of something
in the public domain, doesn’t strike me as so terrible.
WG: But you are using copyright to subsidize the publisher.
LW: That’s not new.
WG: You are right, it is not new. But it is also not a justification for
copyright.
LW: Why should facilitating convenience be a reason to weaken copy
right, but facilitating distribution not be a reason to strengthen it? We
disagree here. If you accept that publishing serves some public good in
facilitating the public’s access to creative works, I don't think it’s
inappropriate to choose to use copyright law to promote that policy.
WG: I thought we began by agreeing that copyright was intended to
provide incentives for creativity. The federal government is not empowered
to do everything Congress desires. The Constitution makes encouragement
of authorship one of Congress’s enumerated powers. In enacting copyright
legislation, Congress can only be concerned with giving incentives (or
perhaps justice) to persons investing in creative effort, for the purposes
of increasing the amount of creative effort. I think the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Feist50 case supports that reasoning.
LW: But Congress can legitimately be concerned with the whole range
of circumstances — the whole causal chain — between creativity and
progress. Look at the way section 106(3) gives copyright owners exclusive
rights over initial distribution.5051 You may disagree with me, but I believe
that it is well established that promoting dissemination is a recognized
object of copyright.52 By definition, distribution takes place after creation,
but Congress nevertheless included a distribution right in section 106.
WG: The distribution right helps give incentives to authors, so its existence
doesn’t prove anything about whether publishers’ interests standing alone
could justify a copyright provision.
Why don’t we start at the beginning, with the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution?53 For example, is copyright legitimately
concerned with any activity that promotes ‘progress and the useful arts?’
I think the answer is clearly no. Clearly, some things that promote ‘progress
50 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company. Inc.. 499 IJ.S. 340 (1991).
51 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002).
52 Eldred, 537 U S. at 244 (2003).

53

u.s.

Const art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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and the useful arts’ (like a stable police force to maintain the public order
that permits artists to work) are state, not federal, concerns.
The clause also says Congress can grant exclusive rights. So, is
copyright legitimately concerned with anything that both grants exclusive
rights and promotes progress? I would say no. Some exclusive rights might
help progress but are not a legitimate concern of copyright. Again, look
at the Feist decision. Even though a publisher expends money and time,
and even though strangers might destructively free ride, the court held that
no copyright exists in databases that lack creativity. Therefore, I would
say that noncreative compilations and other noncreative activities are not
a legitimate concern of Congress under the clause. And the act of
digitization is a noncreative act.
LW: The opinion in Feist doesn’t address what is or isn’t a legitimate
concern of copyright, but rather addresses the narrower question of what
kind of work can be subject to copyright. The issue wasn’t whether
Congress could legislate about non-creative compilations, it was whether
a non-creative compilation could be protected by copyright. It is conceiv
able that Congress in deciding how to regulate a creative work might
legitimately take into account an interest that by itself wouldn’t justify
an exclusive right.
WG: Okay, I concede that Feist by itself doesn’t address the entire range
of potentially legitimate concerns: It never says outright, “It’s only
creativity that can matter in all copyright contexts”. The holding only
addressed one context: the opinion identified what gives rise to copyright
in the first instance. This distinction is the point that the Eldred court seized
on.
However, I see it as a distinction without a difference. Once one grants
with Feist that originality is the Constitutional sine qua non for granting
copyright, how can one make originality irrelevant to construing Con
gress’s legitimate powers?
So I concede that Feist didn’t squarely hold that Congress must base
all its copyright legislation on reasons related to creativity. Yet that does
seem a logical implication. You need more than Tack of logical entailment’
to get to the position that encouraging noncreative physical activity is an
appropriate concern for copyright.
LW: That’s partly true. I do agree that Feist does not compel a result
on the question of “what is a legitimate copyright concern” either way.
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WG: Not even Eldred compels an answer to that question. At no point
does the Court say, “Term extension is justifiable by sole reference to the
way it assists noncreative activity like digitization and archival
preservation”.
I would still argue that even if it is not logically entailed, Feist ‘leans
toward’ my position and away from your position. But to fully analyze
this would require us to look at Constitutional and legislative history, as
well as cases. This would take us away from our current issue of what
logic can tell us.
LW: Okay — in my view, logic tells us that the presence of a distribution
right in section 106 indicates that Congress is concerned with how creative
works are disseminated as well as how they’re written. And I think that
is an important point — commercial distribution of creative works is still
the most effective way for those works to get into the hands of the public.
A publisher, acting on its own behalf or as the agent, licensee or assignee
of the author, has to be able to enforce that right. And there is nothing
inconsistent with Feist or, certainly, Eldred, in saying that copyright law
protects both creation and dissemination.
WG: I agree that Congress is legitimately concerned with how creative
works are disseminated, but only to the extent that the dissemination affects
incentives to be creative. Most often, a right of distribution assists
creativity.
LW: We could argue about this forever, but I think the conclusion may
be a compromise. I’m willing to concede that section 106 doesn’t unam
biguously support my position, but I think you should concede that Feist
doesn’t unambiguously support yours.
WG: It’s a deal.
Actually, I like “deal” as a metaphor for what we’re talking about. One
way to look at copyright is as a deal, an arrangement, a way for people
to work together to get the creative expressions they need. They cannot
coordinate themselves without a device that enables them to restrict each
other mutually — in a way that benefits them mutually. Copyright is a
group of people saying: “I am willing to pay a little more for a copy in
order to get more works created.” The question is whether copyright law
today well serves the people who set it up. I think copyright could do
better. The public is being hurt more than it should, and some creativity
is being impaired.
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LW: It s not really fair to ask you to keep giving examples of that, I know,
because what you are arguing is that things would otherwise be happening
which are not now, and it is of course very hard to prove the negative.
But what I see happening is a vibrant market for creative work, in art,
in music, in all of the disciplines. Truly creative and transformative work
can and is being done under the current copyright system. Authors are
being compensated (through advances and royalties) by publishers, who
then seek an economic return from customers, which is a system that 1
believe reflects economic efficiency, not a policy shift away from reward
ing authors to rewarding publishers. But I would also concede that
copyright law can and does interfere with certain uses of copyrighted
works. Non-transformative uses of existing material are, dearly, being
impeded. Somewhere between the two extremes there is probably a perfect
point of balance, but you and I will have to keep talking to each other
— if we’re going to have any hope of finding it!
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